by Rony Abdelnour, a Lebanese Journalist & Reader of this Site.

July 21 2009 

Three years ago, on July 12, 2006, in the midst of a prosperous Lebanese summer,  a devastating war broke out between Israel and Lebanon.

While some said that a large-scale escalation would not have taken place without Hezbollah's capture of two Israeli soldiers, others believed that Israel would take action sooner or later to staunch Hezbollah's growth. 

Regardless of the true cause of the war, what happened in 2006 was an inevitable outcome of Israel's fears and Hezbollah's basic ideology of liberating Palestine. 

On the third anniversary of the war, almost every reason that led to it still exists. Israel still sees in Hezbollah a true foe, while Hezbollah still holds a very hostile stand against Israel. Thus, one might look at the war from another perspective. What have Israel and Hezbollah achieved or lost? 

First, Israel's announced goal prior to the war was to weaken Hezbollah. In the wake of Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000 - Hezbollah had piled up thousands of rockets, missiles and sophisticated systems acquired from Iran and Syria.  Israel's bet on destroying Hezbollah proved to be a disastrous strategic conception. Moreover, the war has shown how much difficult it is to a regular army to fight against an irregular armed group (forces able to hit and run easily due to a very limited reliance on fixed facilities). And though Hezbollah's strikes were not accurate enough to cause lethal casualties, they spread panic throughout the Northern part of Israel and damaged the Israeli economy. 

In addition, realizing that a land invasion a la 1982 invasion might have an even much worse outcome than being content with ineffective air raids, Israel's bet has shifted during the war toward making the Lebanese government and armed forces act against Hezbollah. Such a bet proved no effectiveness as well. In fact, as Anthony H. Cordesman puts it in a study published by the Center for Strategic and international Studies back in 2006, Lebanon's complicated confessional and sectarian divisions make the country too fragile and vulnerable to new struggles, which makes Lebanese actors all the more reluctant to mess with such a divided internal structure. Here again, Israel encountered another tactical miscalculation.  

However, Israel's failures in the 2006 war do not mean that Lebanon was in a better off situation. Lebanese casualties - mainly belonging to shi'ite community of Southern Lebanon and Beirut's Southern Suburb - were shockingly formidable (more than 1000 Lebanese killed compared to few Israelis). Besides, the war displaced, according to estimations, about half a million Lebanese. Tourism was hurt badly and great damages hit the infrastructure across the country. As for Hezbollah, it is true that it has resisted over 33 days of continuous strikes and gained additional credits in the Arab world as a solid fighter against Israel, but such a gain was accompanied by a strategic loss: The UN security council resolution 1701 forced Hezbollah to retreat behind the Litani river's border only to be replaced by the Lebanese army forces and the UNIFIl (something that has never happened since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000).

 The war can be fairly described as a lose - lose situation. Neither part achieved what it has planned for. Israel freed the kidnapped soldiers (bodies) only through an exchange for other Arab bodies. It has also seen its arrogance deteriorate due to a lack of accomplishment against a small group of fighters. As for Hezbollah, though it has succeeded in the wake of the war and during the following period in strengthening its arsenal, it has lost the previous full control over the southern Lebanon area, and has been also subject to internal debate regarding its legitimate presence as an armed force within Lebanon.