(left, Nazis march down Champs de Elyse)
How Germany Rose From Nazi Ashes-2
The Role of Argentina and France
Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile (1981) by Paul Manning - Below are excerpts from a summary by Dave Emory, who deserves credit for keeping this story alive.
Long after the war, the Bormann organization continued to wield effective control of the French economy, utilizing the corporate relationships developed before and during the occupation. This control is exercised by a shadowy network of personal contacts, the Illuminati, which includes both Nazis and their erstwhile "enemies."
by Paul Manning
Among the many countries that figured in an important way in the Bormann structure were Argentina and France.
When Bormann gave the go-ahead in his overall flight capital program after the decisions at Strasbourg, [in August 1944] over $6 billion of this money flowed into Buenos Aires for investment there and elsewhere in Latin America. The investments covered factories, hotels, resorts, cattle, banks, land, sugar and coffee plantations, metallurgy, insurance, electrical products, construction, and communications. It is much the same investment spectrum as established in Spain. West German [i.e. Nazi] investments today account for nearly 45 percent of all foreign investments in Spain.
French financial institutions were central to the Bormann plan. Before D-day four Paris banks, Worms et Cie., Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas, Banque de l'Indochine (now with 'et de Suez' added to its name), and Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie (now Banque Nationale de Paris), were used by Bormann to siphon NSDAP and other German money in France to their bank branches in the colonies, where it was safeguarded and invested for its German ownership. (Ibid.; p. 140.)
In the years before the war, the German businessmen, industrialists, and bankers had established close ties with their counterparts in France. After the blitzkrieg and invasion, the same Frenchmen in many cases went on working with their German peers. They didn't have much choice, to be sure, and the occupation being instituted, very few in the high echelons of commerce and finance failed to collaborate. The Third Republic's business elite was virtually unchanged after 1940 . . .
They regarded the war and Hitler as an unfortunate diversion from their chief mission of preventing a communist revolution in France. Antibolshevism was a common denominator linking these Frenchmen to Germans, and it accounted for a volunteer French division on the Eastern Front. . .The upper-class men who had been superbly trained in finance and administration at one of the two grand corps schools were referred to as France's permanent 'wall of money,' and as professionals they came into their own in 1940. They agreed to the establishment of German subsidiary firms in France and permitted a general buy-in to French companies.
The German economic control of the French economy proceeded smoothly into the postwar period. Long after the war, the Bormann organization continued to wield effective control of the French economy, utilizing the corporate relationships developed before and during the occupation.
The characteristic secrecy surrounding the actions of German industrialists and bankers during the final nine months of the war, when Bormann's flight capital program held their complete attention, was also carried over into the postwar years, when they began pulling back the skeins of economic wealth and power that stretched out to neutral nations of the world and to formerly occupied lands.
There was a suggestion of this in France. Flora Lewis, writing from Paris in the New York Times of August 28, 1972, told of her conversation with a French publisher: 'It would not be possible to trace ownership of corporations and the power structure as in the United States. 'They' would not permit it. 'They' would find a way to hound and torture anyone who tried,' commented the publisher. 'They' seem to be a fairly small group of people who know each other, but many are not at all known to the public. 'They' move in and out of government jobs, but public service apparently serves to win private promotion rather than the other way around.
The Government 'control' that practically everyone mentions cannot be traced through stock holdings, regulatory agencies, public decisions. It seems to function through a maze of personal contacts and tacit understandings.' The understandings arrived at in the power structure of France reach back to prewar days, were continued during the occupation, and have carried over to the present time.
Lewis, in her report from Paris, commented further: 'This hidden control of government and corporations has produced a general unease in Paris.' Along with the unease, the fact that France has lingering and serious social and political ailments is a residue of World War II and of an economic occupation that was never really terminated with the withdrawal of German troops beyond the Rhine. It was this special economic relationship between German and French industrialists that made it possible for Friedrich Flick to arrange with the De-Wendel steel firm in France for purchase of his shares in his Ruhr coal combine for $45 million, which was to start him once more on the road back to wealth and power, after years in prison following his conviction at Nuremberg.
West Germany's economic power structure is fueled by a two-tier system: the corporations and individuals who publicly represent the products that are common household names around the world, and the secretive groups operating in the background as holding companies and who pull the threads of power in overseas corporations established during the Bormann tenure in the Third Reich.
As explained to me, 'These threads are like the strands of a spider's web and no one knows where they lead -- except the inner circle of the Bormann organization in South America.